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FEDERAL PLEADING AND STATE PRESUIT DISCOVERY 
by 
Scott Dodson* 
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in 
rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal—
when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or 
minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, 
but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a 
motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the 
development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly 
through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the 
effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the 
harsh results that they can have when the plaintiff is confronted with 
information asymmetry. Third, this Article describes various state law 
presuit discovery tools that are available to be used by plaintiffs who fear 
dismissal under the federal pleading standards. It then considers whether 
they can be an effective tool for avoiding dismissal, in light of both their 
utility and their limitations. Finally, this Article argues that both the 
availability and limitations of state presuit discovery options support 
amending the federal rules to provide for federal presuit discovery. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an exciting time to be a federal civil rules buff. Historically, 
blockbuster opinions involving the civil rules have been few and far 
between. But the last two years have been an exception. Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 together have transformed federal civil 
pleading from a seventy-year3 pleading regime based primarily on notice 
to a newly-minted “plausibility” regime based primarily on non-
conclusory facts. 
That transformation implicates high stakes for plaintiffs proceeding 
with claims that depend upon facts exclusively in the hands (or minds) of 
defendants and third parties. The plaintiff may need those facts to plead 
her claim properly under Twombly and Iqbal, but she may not be able to 
discover those facts unless she can survive a motion to dismiss. 
Commentators have begun to explore ways out of this catch-22. One 
of the most obvious is to abrogate or limit Twombly and Iqbal.4 Others 
 
1 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
2 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
3 Some might say “fifty-year regime.” See Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: 
Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 317–18 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 
2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the original rules were stricter than Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41 (1957), interpreted them to be); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 985, 992–94 (1987) (same). 
4 By my count, no less than seven such proposals have been offered in writing 
since Iqbal. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a) 
(2009) (“A court shall not dismiss a complaint under [Rule 12] unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which 
would entitled the plaintiff to relief. A court shall not dismiss a complaint . . . on the 
basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do 
not show the plaintiff’s claim to be plausible . . . .”); Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
which takes effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not 
dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).”); Has the Supreme Court Limited 
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank), available at http://judiciary. 
senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf (“[T]he law governing (a) 
dismissal or striking of all or any part of a pleading containing a claim or defense for 
failure to state a claim, indefiniteness, or insufficiency and (b) judgment on the 
pleadings, shall be in accordance with interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by lower courts in 
decisions consistent with such interpretations, that existed on May 20, 2007.”); Kevin 
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 50), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1448796 (suggesting Rule 8(a) should be amended in this way: “a short and plain 
statement of the claim—regardless of its nonconclusory plausibility—showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief”); Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, An 
Alternative to Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Bill, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/07/ 
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have suggested tinkering with federal discovery rules or practices to 
ameliorate the harsh results of plausibility pleading.5 Those possibilities 
are promising, but they also run up against the time-consuming, 
cumbersome, and politically uncertain task of revising the federal rules 
or statutorily overturning them.6 
But a less obvious way out may already exist: using presuit discovery 
to gather the facts needed to survive a motion to dismiss based on 
Twombly and Iqbal. Federal presuit discovery is of little help here: Rule 27 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7 allows for presuit discovery only 
to perpetuate testimony, not to discover new facts needed to survive a 
motion to dismiss.8 But many state rules permit presuit discovery, and 
several do so for the express purpose of drafting a sufficient complaint. 
Although these rules likely were not designed for this purpose, plaintiffs 
could use these state procedures in state court to obtain the information 
 
alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html (July 29, 2009, 3:13 AM) (“Except as 
otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after the date of enactment of this 
Act, a Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under rule 8(a)(2) or rule 
8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that such pleading 
is conclusory or implausible, except that a court may take judicial notice of the 
implausibility of a factual allegation. So long as the pleaded claim or defense provides 
fair notice of the nature of the claim or defense, and the allegations, if taken to be 
true, would support a legally sufficient claim or defense, a pleading satisfies the 
requirements of rule 8.”); Posting of David Shapiro, dshapiro@law.harvard.edu, to 
Civil Procedure Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (July 7, 2009) (on file with author) 
(“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute or in these rules, an allegation of 
fact, or of the application of law to fact, shall [must?] not be held insufficient on the 
grounds that it is conclusory and/or implausible, unless the rules governing judicial 
notice require a determination that the allegation is not credible.”); Posting of Art 
Wolf, awolf@law.wnec.edu, to Civil Procedure Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Oct. 
20, 2009) (on file with author) (proposing amending Rule 8(a)(2) to read “a short 
and plain statement giving [sufficient] notice of the claim upon which relief can be 
granted” or “a short and plain statement of the claim upon which relief can be 
granted so that a party can [may] reasonably prepare a response” (alterations in 
original)); cf. Posting of Jonathan Siegel, jsiegel@law.gwu.edu, to Civil Procedure 
Listserv, civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file with author) (favoring the 
promulgation of new Federal Forms to abrogate Twombly and Iqbal, and proposing 
examples). No doubt others are percolating. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff 
with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power 
over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1223–24 (2008) (suggesting that the Rules 
Advisory Committee considered options for overturning the effect of Twombly). 
5 See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1 (2009) (suggesting such proposals). 
6 See Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court’s ‘Iqbal’ 
Ruling, LAW.COM, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120243 
3931370 (reporting that the chair of the rules committee intends to be cautious 
about rule amendments to soften Iqbal). 
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 27. 
8 See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of 
Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 226–27 (2007). 
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necessary to file a complaint that ultimately would be subject to federal 
pleading standards. 
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play 
in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal. Part 
II of this Article provides an account of the development of federal 
pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal 
state. Part III describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading 
standards and highlights the harsh results that they can have when the 
plaintiff is confronted with information asymmetry.  
Part IV then describes various state law presuit discovery tools that 
are available to be used by plaintiffs who fear dismissal under the federal 
pleading standards. It then considers whether they can be an effective 
tool for avoiding dismissal, in light of both their utility and their 
limitations. Two points bear clarification here. The first is that I mean to 
focus on the role state presuit discovery can play in state courts to obtain 
information that then will enable the plaintiff to avoid dismissal in 
federal court. Thus, I do not intend to delve into the murky waters of 
whether federal courts could (or must) implement state presuit discovery 
rules under Erie.9 The second is that most state presuit discovery really is 
presuit; thus, the presuit discovery mechanisms can be implemented 
before any substantive claims are filed in a complaint. As I will explain 
below, that feature makes removal of presuit discovery difficult, if not 
impossible.  
Part V concludes by suggesting that both the availability and 
limitations of state presuit discovery options support amending the 
federal rules to provide for federal presuit discovery. 
II. PLEADINGS DEVELOPMENT THROUGH IQBAL 
A. Pre-Twombly Law 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principal 
pleadings rule, was adopted in 1938 and replaced a code pleading regime 
that differed substantially from its successor. The code required the 
complaint to contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of 
action.”10 Rule 8, by contrast, is conspicuously silent on fact pleading,11 
instead requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”12 
 
9 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For more on that thorny issue, 
see infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
10 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521; see also 5 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1216, at 207 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the fact pleading required by the codes). 
11 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1216, at 207 (“Conspicuously absent 
from Federal Rule 8(a)(2) is the requirement found in the codes that the pleader set 
forth the ‘facts’ constituting a ‘cause of action.’”). 
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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The drafters of Rule 8 intentionally devised a pleading regime more 
lenient than that of the codes.13 They wished to reduce the importance of 
pleadings and their technicalities.14 Indeed, Charles Clark, the principal 
draftsman of Rule 8, initially favored eliminating special pleadings 
altogether and argued for a standard requiring a concise statement of 
only pertinent facts with little legal recitation.15 Although that was not to 
be, Rule 8 implemented a pleading regime less concerned about facts 
and more concerned with providing notice.16 As the Seventh Circuit once 
put it, “a judicial order dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff did 
not plead facts [under Rule 8] has a short half-life.”17 
Nevertheless, the lower courts largely resisted this liberal pleading 
standard until 1957,18 when the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson, 
declared that Rule 8 does “not require a claimant to set out in detail the 
facts upon which he bases his claim,” but instead requires only 
“simplified ‘notice pleading.’”19 Although lower courts continued to 
attempt to impose heightened pleading in a variety of contexts,20 the 
Court continued, often unanimously, to strike those attempts down and 
to adhere to the liberal notice pleading standard of Conley.21 At least, that 
was the case until 2007. 
 
13 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986). 
14 See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749, 1749 (1998). 
15 See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
85 YALE L.J. 914, 923–28 (1976). 
16 See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351994 (describing 
this contrast); see also Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Posner, J.) (“The federal rules replaced fact pleading with notice pleading.”). 
17 Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Kolupa 
v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Any decision declaring ‘this 
complaint is deficient because it does not allege X’ is a candidate for summary 
reversal . . . .”). 
18 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 
1685 (1998); Marcus, supra note 13, at 433. 
19 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957); see also Spencer, supra note 5, at 5 
(arguing that Conley endorsed a notice pleading regime under Rule 8); Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5) (“Under the Rules, then, pleading was a 
pervious gate. Its main task was to give fair notice of the pleader’s contentions to the 
adversary (and the court and the public).”). But see Sherwin, supra note 3, at 317–18 
(arguing that the original rules were stricter than Conley interpreted them to be); 
Subrin, supra note 3, at 985, 992–94.  
20 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 551 
(2002) (“Despite this clarity [of Rule 8] and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, federal courts have embraced heightened 
pleading burdens in a variety of situations.”). 
21 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 
(2002); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
987, 997 (2003) (“[W]hen called upon to address pleading issues square on, the 
Court continually—and unanimously—embrace[d] simplified notice pleading.”). 
Do Not Delete 2/11/2010  8:04 PM 
48 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
B. Twombly 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly22 
and turned the civil procedure world on its head.23 Twombly involved an 
antitrust conspiracy class action complaint alleging conscious parallel 
conduct among telecommunications providers.24 Conscious parallel 
conduct alone does not prove a conspiracy under substantive antitrust 
law.25 But the Supreme Court had never imposed that evidentiary 
standard at the pleadings stage before. 
Twombly did just that. The Court held that plaintiffs seeking to avoid 
dismissal of their complaint must plead “plausible grounds” for inferring 
a conspiracy, and that allegations of conscious parallel conduct alone 
would not suffice.26  
Twombly created widespread uncertainty among lower courts and 
commentators.27 The Court did not explain whether its holding was trans-
substantive28 or not, such as being limited to costly litigations29 or 
 
22 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
23 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2) (“The headline need no 
longer equivocate . . . . The U.S. Supreme Court has revolutionized the law on 
pleading.”); Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 3) (calling the case “dramatic[]”); 
Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 135, 135 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/ 
dodson.pdf (arguing that the Court “gutted the venerable language from Conley v. 
Gibson that every civil procedure professor and student can recite almost by heart”). 
24 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961–62. 
25 Id. at 1964. 
26 Id. at 1964–66, 1966 n.5. What is required under Rule 8 and what is needed to 
survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) are not necessarily the same, and it does not 
appear that the Supreme Court, in either Conley or Twombly, has given much thought 
to those distinctions. I leave deeper exploration of those issues for another day. 
27 See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 19) (“Twombly raised a stir after 
it was decided, resulting in mass confusion about its scope and meaning.”); Dodson, 
supra note 23, at 141–42 (documenting the uncertainties remaining after Twombly); 
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts 
After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008) (“We district 
court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we 
thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case 
for failure to state a claim.”); Posting of Scott Dodson to PrawfsBlawg, The Mystery of 
Twombly Continues, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-
mystery-of.html (Feb. 5, 2008, 11:40 PM) (describing circuit confusion). 
28 See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 23, at 140 (arguing that “the best reading of Bell 
Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires notice-plus pleading for all cases”). 
29 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a 
plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery 
process through ‘careful case management,’ . . . given the common lament that the 
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest 
side. . . . [T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases.”); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1063, 1083–85 (2009) (suggesting that Twombly applied only to complex, high-
discovery-cost cases). 
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antitrust conspiracy claims.30 Nor did the Court explain what its new 
“plausibility” test was or how it might be applied in different cases.31 Some 
even wondered whether Twombly was significant as a pleadings case.32 Just 
about the only thing that was clear from Twombly was that it would take 
another pronouncement from the Court to answer these questions. 
C. Iqbal 
That pronouncement came on May 18, 2009, when the Court 
decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal.33 There, an executive detainee sued John 
Ashcroft, the former U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, the FBI 
Director, alleging that they adopted a policy of discrimination on the 
basis of race, religion, and national origin in the aftermath of September 
11th.34 The defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense and argued 
that Iqbal had failed to plead a “plausible” showing of entitlement to 
relief under Twombly.35 
The Supreme Court agreed. In the process, it confirmed that 
Twombly’s plausibility standard for Rule 8 pleading was a new36 factual 
 
30 See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading 
Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 635–36 (2007) (“[T]he ‘better’ reading of Bell Atlantic is that 
it did not change the law of pleading, but that it simply applied long-accepted 
pleading standards to a unique body of law under which the plaintiffs’ complaint 
failed to include any facts or plausible inferences supportive of a material element of 
the claim specifically asserted by the plaintiffs.”). 
31 Compare Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any ‘heightened’ 
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9.”), and id. at 1974 (“Here, . . . we do not require heightened fact 
pleading of specifics . . . .”), with Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, The End 
of Notice Pleading?, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html 
(May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM) (asserting that Twombly imposes a heightened pleading 
standard), and A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 475 
(2008) (arguing that Twombly imposes “a pleading obligation that approaches the 
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)”), and with Dodson, supra note 23, at 140 
(“What Rule 8 requires after both Erickson and Bell Atlantic are not specific facts, but 
sufficient facts such that the complaint as a whole makes a ‘showing’ of entitlement to 
relief.”), and Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 22) (arguing that Twombly shifted 
the pleadings emphasis from one of notice to one of facts). 
32 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877 (2009) (arguing that Twombly’s import is modest); 
Posting of Einer Elhauge to The Volokh Conspiracy, Twombly—The New Supreme 
Court Antitrust Conspiracy Case, http://volokh.com/2007/05/21/twombly-the-new-
supreme-court-antitrust-conspiracy-case (May 21, 2007, 6:15 PM) (calling the decision 
“quite insignificant”). But see Dodson, supra note 23, at 137 (“Bell Atlantic is a 
significant statement from the Court from a proceduralist perspective.”). 
33 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
34 Id. at 1942. 
35 Id.; Brief for the Petitioners at 12–13, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015). 
36 Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are 
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
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sufficiency standard that operates independent of the notice 
requirement,37 and that the plausibility standard was trans-substantive, 
spanning all Rule 8 cases regardless of the cause of action or the 
anticipated cost of discovery.38 
In addition, the Court imposed a new pleadings dichotomy between 
conclusory and non-conclusory factual allegations. Iqbal alleged that the 
defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 
subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for 
no legitimate penological interest.’”39 He also alleged that the defendants 
were “instrumental” and the “principal architect” of the discriminatory 
policies.40 
The Court disregarded these allegations as conclusory and 
unsupported by additional factual allegations.41 The Court stated: “Rule 8 
marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”42 
Accordingly, the Court refused to credit those allegations and instead 
assessed the plausibility of the complaint without them. Under that 
standard, “respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual 
allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state 
 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007))), with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974) (“[I]t is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, . . . the 
allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”), and 5B 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1357, at 417 (“A proposition that is at the heart of 
the application of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and one that is of universal 
acceptance . . . is that for purposes of the motion to dismiss . . . all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the pleading are drawn in favor of the pleader.”); 
see also Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog, Beyond 
Twombly, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-twombly-by-
prof-scott-dodson.html (May 18, 2009) (“I think it is fair to say that we have entered a 
new era in pleadings. Notice is now an aside, probably insignificant in most cases. 
Instead, pleadings litigation will focus on factual sufficiency.”). 
37 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (stating that Twombly required “sufficient factual 
matter” to state a plausible claim); see also Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 24) 
(collecting additional cites from Iqbal). 
38 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for ‘all civil actions,’ . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits 
alike.”); id. at 1953–54 (“We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading 
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners 
minimally intrusive discovery.”); see also Dodson, supra note 36 (“Twombly’s 
‘plausibility’ standard is clearly now a uniform Rule 8 standard, not a standard borne 
of antitrust law or reserved for certain claims, as some had argued.”). 
39 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand 
at ¶ 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA), 2005 WL 2375202 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1950. 
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of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard necessary to 
comply with Rule 8.”43 
Taken together, Twombly and Iqbal are having a transformative 
impact on pleading. In August 2009, for example, a district court 
dismissed a garden-variety slip-and-fall negligence case under the new 
standard because of the plaintiff’s failure to plead certain facts.44 The 
plaintiff pleaded that there was liquid on the floor and that the 
defendant negligently failed to remove the liquid or warn her of its 
presence.45 The district court, incorporating evidentiary standards of 
proof into the pleading burden, dismissed the complaint because, 
the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show how the liquid 
came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should 
have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiff’s 
accident occurred. . . . While consistent with the possibility of the 
Defendant’s liability, the Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the 
Defendant was negligent . . . are insufficient to state a plausible 
claim for relief.46 
That is a far cry from notice pleading pre-Twombly.47 
III. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING EFFECTS 
As I have argued elsewhere, Twombly and Iqbal impose a fact pleading 
requirement on Rule 8.48 The plausibility standard of Twombly assesses the 
factual sufficiency of the allegations. And, the conclusory/non-conclusory 
dichotomy of Iqbal forces a plaintiff to detail factual support for her 
allegations to avoid having them be deemed “conclusory” and thus 
disregarded. As Professors Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have 
recently argued, “[A]s to factual sufficiency, the plaintiff practically must 
plead facts and even some evidence. The plaintiff should give a 
particularized mention of the factual circumstances of each element of 
the claim.”49 Thus, the Twombly-Iqbal standard focuses motions to dismiss 
on factual detail, resulting in some cases being dismissed that would not 
have been under pre-Twombly standards.50  
Dismissing at an early stage cases that lack merit has its benefits. 
Such dismissals will conserve judicial resources for those claims that do 
 
43 Id. at 1952. 
44 Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Civil No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *3 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (mem.). 
45 Id. at *1. 
46 Id. at *2. 
47 Professor Robert Bone has argued that Iqbal represents a far cry from the 
pleading standards even of Twombly. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited 
and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467799. 
48 See Dodson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 25); Dodson, supra note 23, at 138. 
49 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 11).  
50 Dodson, supra note 23, at 142. 
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have merit and will save both plaintiffs and defendants the time and 
money they would otherwise spend litigating meritless cases. The 
question is whether the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard is an appropriate 
proxy for meritlessness. 
In some cases, the inability or refusal of a plaintiff to plead sufficient 
non-conclusory facts under Twombly and Iqbal might indeed suggest that 
the plaintiff’s claims are meritless. After all, plaintiffs have resources—
such as public information, informal investigation, state inspection 
statutes,51 and the Freedom of Information Act52—to get certain facts 
prior to filing a complaint. If the facts necessary to survive a motion to 
dismiss ought to be available to the plaintiff through these means, and 
the plaintiff does not plead them, then it may be reasonable to infer that 
the failure to plead those facts with plausibility means that those facts do 
not exist, and that the plaintiff will be unable to prove her claim without 
them.53 
But that inference is not always reasonable.54 Some facts may be 
solely in the hands of the defendants or hostile third parties. Certain 
claims, especially those hinging on the defendant’s state of mind or 
secretive conduct, are particularly susceptible to that kind of 
“information asymmetry.”55 Civil rights and discrimination claims, 
corporate wrongdoing, unlawful conspiracies, and intentional torts are 
all good examples.56 
 
51 See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection 
Statutes for Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Actions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69 (1997). 
52 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). 
53 Of course, other reasons might cause such a pleading. Uncovering the 
necessary facts through non-discovery means might be cost-prohibitive, or the party 
or her attorney may simply have overlooked an opportunity for obtaining the 
information. 
54 See Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure & Federal Courts Blog, Against 
Twombly & Iqbal—A Reply to Drug & Device Law Post, http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/civpro/2009/06/response-to-drug-device-law-post.html (June 5, 2009) 
(“The failure to plead a plausible claim is not necessarily an indication that the claim 
lacks merit.”). The opinion in Twombly assumes the opposite. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (“[I]t is only by taking care to require 
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the 
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope 
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.” 
(quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))). 
55 Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542 (1997) 
(using the term “asymmetric information”); Posting of Randal Picker to The 
University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Closing the Doors to (Antitrust) 
Plaintiffs?, (May 21, 2007, 4:45 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/ 
05/closing_the_doo.html (using the term). 
56 See Dodson, supra note 54 (“In those cases, the information often necessary to 
meet the plausibility standard is largely in the hands of the defendants.”); Kendall W. 
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding 
that dismissal rates rose in civil rights cases after Twombly); Lonny Hoffman, Using 
Presuit Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 LITIG. 31, 32 (2008) 
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The fortunate plaintiff may find external evidence that creates a 
legally permissible inference of the defendant’s state of mind in such 
cases,57 but not all plaintiffs will be so fortunate. Less fortunate plaintiffs 
may require formal discovery to obtain those facts. Though they may 
actually have suffered cognizable harm, these plaintiffs cannot survive a 
motion to dismiss without formal discovery and cannot access formal 
discovery without surviving a motion to dismiss.58 In such cases, the 
plausibility standard imposes a significant cost—the dismissal of 
meritorious claims through no fault of the plaintiff.59 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Therein lies the catch-22: a plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, 
but, because critical facts are solely within the possession of the 
defendant, she cannot plead her claims with sufficient factual detail to 
survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal. If only she could get 
 
(mentioning these cases); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed 
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 
(“[T]he lower courts are unquestionably using the new plausibility standard to 
dismiss Title VII claims.”); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of 
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the impact of 
plausibility pleading on civil rights and discrimination claims); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989) (noting that civil rights 
plaintiffs “rarely will possess or be able to obtain information pertinent to their 
cases . . . available only during discovery”). 
57 See, e.g., Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4 (describing facts that would give rise to 
an inference of an antitrust conspiracy); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: 
How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
61 (2007) (discussing publicly available information supporting an inference of 
conspiracy); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507 (2009) 
(discussing publicly available information supporting an inference of scienter in 
securities fraud). 
58 Professor Edward Hartnett argues that district courts have the power to permit 
discovery pending a decision on a motion to dismiss. See Edward Hartnett, Taming 
Twombly, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1452875. I discuss this possibility in greater depth below. 
59 Dodson, supra note 36 (predicting that plausibility pleading “will surely result 
in fewer meritorious cases filed, more meritorious cases dismissed, and less unlawful 
conduct redressed”); Dodson, supra note 54 (“[E]rroneously equating the failure to 
plead plausibility with meritlessness will result in fewer meritorious cases filed, fewer 
meritorious cases surviving to discovery, and fewer injuries resulting from wrongful 
conduct being redressed.”); Dodson, supra note 23, at 138–39 (“Safeguarding 
defendants from meritless strike suits is all fine and good. But using fact pleading 
standards to do so is problematic. Antitrust plaintiffs often do not possess evidence of 
an agreement to conspire, and requiring such evidence prior to discovery may 
prevent them from ever having it. It may be that Twombly did not allege more facts 
because he simply did not have them yet, not because they did not exist . . . . [T]he 
Court’s standard is likely to bar many antitrust cases (and mass tort, discrimination, 
and a host of other cases) with merit.”). 
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some discovery, she might be able to obtain the facts that she needs. But 
how can she obtain that discovery without surviving a motion to dismiss? 
A. Some Unlikely Federal Options 
There are a few federal options for rectifying this problem, but none 
of them is particularly promising. 
First, Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows 
for presuit discovery only to perpetuate testimony,60 is unavailing. Courts 
are nearly uniform in holding that it does not authorize discovery for the 
purpose of obtaining new facts needed to survive a motion to dismiss.61 
Some have urged, notwithstanding the limitations of Rule 27, the 
adoption of a federal mechanism for allowing presuit or pre-dismissal 
discovery.62 But the civil rulemaking process is cumbersome and any rule 
proposal must win the approval of the Supreme Court, the very body that 
imposed the plausibility pleading requirement in the first place. 
Second, the plaintiff could sue a defendant against whom she has a 
plausible claim and then, during discovery in that case, seek to elicit facts 
that would enable her to plead a plausible claim against a second 
defendant against whom she otherwise would not have been able to 
plead a plausible claim. This scenario has promise but only would be 
available to plaintiffs who have plausible claims against the persons who 
have the information the plaintiff needs to assert against the prospective 
defendant. 
Third, Professor Edward Hartnett has argued that discovery can 
proceed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.63 If discovery is 
allowed pending the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs may obtain the 
information they need to survive Twombly and Iqbal in an amended 
complaint.64 Discovery, he argues, could be narrowly tailored to the 
particular allegation at issue.65  
I am convinced that Professor Hartnett is correct that the rules do 
not automatically stay discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss66 
 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 27. 
61 See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 226–27. 
62 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 32, at 910–35 (sketching out such a system); 
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 46–47) (The “civil rulemakers might 
require as the price of admission to discovery—imposed if the opposing party has 
successfully moved under Twombly-Iqbal against the claim—that the claimant 
demonstrate something like probable cause to believe that discovery would yield 
significant pertinent evidence.”); Spencer, supra note 5, at 29–30. 
63 Hartnett, supra note 58 (manuscript at 44). Professor Suzette Malveaux has 
made a similar argument. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: 
How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (arguing for targeted, pre-merits discovery under 
Rule 26 to resolve threshold plausibility issues). 
64 Hartnett, supra note 58 (manuscript at 46–47). 
65 Id. (manuscript at 47). 
66 Id. (manuscript at 44). As he points out, Rule 26(c) allows district courts to stay 
discovery for good cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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(except in specific statutory contexts67) and that a district court has 
discretion to allow discovery to proceed during the pendency of such a 
motion. Indeed, it appears that some courts pre-Twombly have allowed 
discovery even after dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim.68 As 
a related possibility, federal courts may attempt (and have done so 
occasionally in the past) to allow discovery outside of the context of the 
federal rules under an inherent equitable power.69 
But language in Twombly and Iqbal surely will give defendants 
ammunition with which to argue against such discovery, and that same 
language will give district courts great pause before allowing pre- or post-
dismissal discovery or discovery authority outside of the context of the 
federal rules. It was, after all, the very threat of discovery costs and the 
perceived inability of district courts to control it that motivated the Court 
to impose the stricter pleading standard in the first place. Twombly, for 
example, spares no words on that score: 
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement 
to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery 
process through “careful case management” given the common 
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery 
abuse has been on the modest side. . . . [T]he threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic 
cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only 
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting 
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the[se] potentially enormous 
expense[s] of discovery . . . .70 
Iqbal was even more emphatic: “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous 
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, 
but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”71 And again: “We decline respondent’s 
invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the 
Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. . . . 
Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not 
entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”72 
The import of Twombly and Iqbal is that only a complaint that can 
survive a motion to dismiss entitles a plaintiff to discovery from the 
defendant or third parties. In order to take advantage of Professor 
 
67 Securities fraud is a notable example. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2006). 
68 See, e.g., Cordero-Hernández v. Hernández-Ballesteros, 449 F.3d 240, 244 (1st 
Cir. 2006); New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Reints v. Sheppard, 90 F.R.D. 346, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1981). 
69 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1406 
(5th Cir. 1993). 
70 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007); see also id. at 1967 n.6 
(“Given the system that we have, the hope of effective judicial supervision is 
slim . . . .”). 
71 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
72 Id. at 1953–54. 
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Hartnett’s solution, a plaintiff would have to file a factually insufficient 
pleading on the hope that the district judge allows discovery to proceed 
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss and in the face of the 
Supreme Court’s statements in Twombly and Iqbal justifying stricter 
pleading standards as a way to control discovery. That strikes me as a 
risky, costly, and altogether unlikely course of action. 
B. Using State Law  
But that is in federal court. Parallel state court systems are generally 
available and can operate simultaneously. Might they provide ways out 
for plaintiffs trapped in federal court by this information asymmetry? 
For plaintiffs able to file their claims in states that retain a notice 
pleading standard more forgiving than the Twombly-Iqbal standard, the 
answer may be yes, but only in insignificant ways for my purposes. To be 
sure, plaintiffs suing non-diverse defendants for state causes of action 
must choose this route because federal court is unavailable. But these 
plaintiffs never had to fear the federal standard at all. It is therefore more 
revealing to ask whether filing a removable claim in state court under a 
forgiving pleading standard would be a useful option. 
Here, I think the answer is probably not. Most federal claims do not 
come with a statutory pleading standard attached to them,73 meaning that 
a state court hearing a federal cause of action probably would apply a 
more liberal state pleading standard instead of the Twombly-Iqbal federal 
pleading standard.74 And, of course, a state would also apply its pleading 
standards to a state claim brought by a plaintiff against a diverse 
defendant.75 But in either case, the state court likely will never have the 
opportunity to apply its more lenient pleading standard. Defendants, 
already prone to removal,76 will favor federal court even more strongly if 
the federal pleading standard is stricter than the state standard of the 
 
73 There are exceptions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (imposing a 
heightened federal pleading standard for federal securities fraud claims). 
74 There is some uncertainty here. Federal pleading standards may control even 
in state court if stricter state pleading standards would impose unnecessary burdens 
on federal rights. See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949). But the 
Supreme Court has never said that principles of preemption or reverse-Erie apply to 
displace more lenient state pleading standards with stricter, non-statutory federal 
pleading standards. But see Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, 
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1452–53 (2008) 
(making the argument). For more on reverse-Erie, see generally Kevin M. Clermont, 
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006). 
75 In contrast with federal control of federal rights or federal procedure, federal 
control of state procedure involving state rights is far more limited. See generally 
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 
(2001). There are a few exceptions but none apply to pleading standards. See, e.g., 
Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) (upholding 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) which 
imposes a federal tolling rule for state statutes of limitations). 
76 See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 
1921–26 (2009). 
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state court in which the case is filed.77 Removal can be accomplished 
almost immediately, followed quickly by a motion to dismiss in federal 
court under the stricter federal standard. Thus, for plaintiffs confronted 
with Twombly and Iqbal, filing a removable case in state court is not a 
comforting option.78  
State law harbors another option for these plaintiffs, however. Like 
federal court, most states allow at least some presuit discovery.79 Many 
state rules mirror federal Rule 27 and are similarly restrictive.80 Others 
allow presuit discovery only to ascertain the identity of potential 
defendants in certain cases and not to determine facts necessary to state a 
claim.81 But several states allow presuit investigative discovery for the 
purposes of filing a sufficient complaint.82 Plaintiffs who otherwise might 
be trapped in federal court with information asymmetry can use these 
procedures as a way to rectify that asymmetry before getting to federal 
court.83 In the next few subparts, I explain how and evaluate the utility of 
those state presuit discovery mechanisms. 
1. State Presuit Discovery Mechanisms 
Texas is perhaps the strongest proponent of presuit discovery for 
purposes of framing a complaint. It allows presuit discovery whenever 
justice or some other benefit outweighs the burden and expense of the 
discovery requested.84 The Texas presuit discovery procedure is routinely 
used to assist plaintiffs in drafting their complaints.85 
Alabama, like Texas, has a strong policy favoring presuit discovery 
for claim investigation. Rule 27 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows pre-action discovery for “[a] person who desires to perpetuate 
[his] own testimony or that of another person or to obtain discovery 
under Rule 34 or Rule 35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable in 
 
77 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13 n.40) (arguing that the 
disparity between liberal state pleading and federal plausibility pleading will incent 
defendants to remove). 
78 Plaintiffs who sue diverse defendants on state law claims in the courts of the 
state of a defendant’s residence can avoid this result because such a case is not 
removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). But, like the plaintiff who sues a non-diverse 
defendant, because such a case is not removable, the plaintiff never had to fear the 
federal Twombly-Iqbal standard in the first place. 
79 Hoffman, supra note 8, at 225. 
80 See id. at 235–36; Jeffrey J. Kroll, The Art and Science of Presuit Discovery, 45 TRIAL 
Mar. 2009, at 28, 29. 
81 See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 238; Kroll, supra note 80, at 29–30. 
82 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
83 Professor Lonny Hoffman has urged state law claimants faced with state 
pleading hurdles and information asymmetry to use state presuit discovery 
mechanisms more liberally. See Hoffman, supra note 56, at 31. He focuses on pleading 
in state court; I focus here on pleading in federal court. 
84 TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, 202.4. 
85 Hoffman, supra note 8, at 253–54 (estimating that Texas presuit discovery has 
been used approximately 4,000 times from 1999–2005 and that over 50% of the time 
the rule was used, it was for presuit discovery). 
Do Not Delete 2/11/2010  8:04 PM 
58 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
any court of this state.”86 The Alabama Supreme Court has construed the 
rule to allow pre-action discovery “regardless of any need to perpetuate 
evidence” if the plaintiff wishes to use it to determine whether she has a 
reasonable basis for filing a lawsuit.87 
Other states are less overt about the availability of presuit discovery 
but nonetheless do recognize it. New York statute provides: “Before an 
action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing an action . . . may be 
obtained, but only by court order.”88 To be entitled to this presuit 
discovery, the applicant must make a prima facie showing that a cause of 
action exists.89 But that does not mean that the applicant must already be 
able to plead the cause of action; to the contrary, the application will be 
denied if the applicant already has sufficient information upon which to 
frame a complaint.90 Thus, New York law allows presuit discovery where 
necessary to plead a claim.91 
Similarly, Ohio allows a petitioner to bring an action for discovery 
when she is otherwise unable to file a complaint without the discovery. 
Rule 34(D)(1) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a 
person who claims to have a potential cause of action may file a petition 
to obtain discovery as provided in this rule.”92 Under this rule, an action 
for discovery may be used “to uncover facts necessary for pleading,”93 
including facts that would allow a plaintiff to determine if she has a valid 
cause of action against a known defendant.94 “[T]he rule acts as a 
safeguard against charges that the plaintiff filed a frivolous lawsuit in a 
case where the wrongdoer or a third party has the ability to hide the facts 
needed by the plaintiff to determine who is the wrongdoer and exactly 
what wrong occurred.”95 
Pennsylvania also allows presuit discovery for purposes of composing 
a complaint. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff 
to “obtain pre-complaint discovery where the information sought is 
material and necessary to the filing of the complaint and the discovery 
 
86 ALA. R. CIV. P. 27. 
87 Ex parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 964 (Ala. 1994); see also Driskill v. Culliver, 
797 So. 2d 495, 497–98 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (allowing pre-action discovery “to 
determine whether the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for filing an action”). 
88 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinneys 2005). 
89 Holzman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 707 N.Y.S.2d 
159, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
90 In re Henry, 843 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); W. Inv. L.L.C. v. 
Georgeson S’holder Sec. Corp., 841 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
91 New York courts have not been entirely clear in explaining what a “prima 
facie” case is, but because they hold that plaintiffs with sufficient evidence to plead a 
claim are not entitled to presuit discovery, the prima facie threshold must be fairly 
minimal. For a more skeptical view, see Hoffman, supra note 8, at 237–38. 
92 OHIO CIV. R. 34(D)(1). 
93 Huge v. Ford Motor Co., 803 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
94 Benner v. Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997). 
95 Id. 
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will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
burden or expense to any person or party.”96 Upon a defendant’s 
objection, the court can require the plaintiff to “state with particularity 
how the discovery will materially advance the preparation of the 
complaint.”97 
Other states besides those I mention above, such as Vermont, appear 
to have statutes or rules allowing presuit discovery to be used in the way I 
suggest, though the case law is too sparse to conclude that definitively.98  
In addition to statutory or rule-based authorizations for presuit 
discovery, most states—though not all99—allow equitable bills of 
discovery. Equitable bills of discovery were the primary mechanism to 
obtain discoverable information in civil cases prior to the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state analogues.100 The 
common law courts provided no mechanism for discovery at all, and, to 
ameliorate that result, equity courts created the bill as an exercise of 
ancillary jurisdiction in aid of actions at law.101 Although modern 
discovery rules in state and federal courts and the merger of law and 
equity have largely replaced the need for equitable bills of discovery, the 
majority of states still allow the bill.102 Courts generally have restricted the 
bill to instances in which discovery cannot otherwise be had under the 
applicable rules and statutes, and where discovery is necessary to secure 
justice in the underlying proceeding.103 Thus, most states that do not have 
a statute or rule allowing for presuit discovery to frame a complaint allow 
an equitable action for a bill of discovery instead.104 
 
96 PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(a). 
97 PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(b). 
98 See, e.g., VT. R. CIV. P. 27 (reporter’s notes following rule stating that Vermont’s 
“Rule 27(a)(1) provides for a verified petition for perpetuation of testimony or other 
appropriate discovery before action” (emphasis added)); In re Burlington Bagel Bakery, 
Inc., 549 A.2d 1044, 1045 (Vt. 1988) (representing the only case interpreting 
Vermont’s rule and stating that the rule “gives the presiding judge discretion to grant 
a petition for preaction discovery if he or she ‘is satisfied that the perpetuation of the 
testimony or other discovery may prevent a failure or delay of justice’” (emphasis 
added)). 
99 See, e.g., Austin v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 891 P.2d 1143, 
1146 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Kansas does not recognize the equitable bill 
of discovery). 
100 Rupert F. Barron, Annotation, Existence and Nature of Cause of Action for 
Equitable Bill of Discovery, 37 A.L.R.5TH 645, 658–59 (1996). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Federal courts are decidedly more mixed about the availability of the 
equitable bill of discovery in federal court after the advent of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provide ample discovery opportunities. See id. Still, at least one 
court since the 1991 amendments to Rules 34 and 45 continues to recognize the 
availability of the bill. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 
F.3d 1397, 1408 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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Connecticut, for example, recognizes an independent equitable 
action for a bill of discovery.105 The bill is designed to obtain evidence for 
use in an action for affirmative relief.106 Because “a pure bill of discovery 
is favored in equity, it should be granted unless there is some well 
founded objection against the exercise of the court’s discretion.”107 To 
sustain the bill, the petitioner must demonstrate that what she seeks to 
discover is material and is necessary to prove, or is needed to aid in 
proving or in defending, another action already brought or about to be 
brought. The petitioner must show that he has no other adequate means 
of enforcing discovery of the desired material, where “adequate” takes 
into consideration convenient, effective, and full relief.108 
2. Minor Limitations 
As the foregoing Part demonstrates, many states allow presuit 
discovery to obtain information that may be critical to surviving a 
Twombly-Iqbal motion to dismiss. To be granted, however, the plaintiff 
must overcome several potential limitations on the viability of the use of 
these state presuit discovery mechanisms. Each of these limitations is 
likely to be minor or easy to overcome. 
First, the plaintiff may worry that the defendant will remove to 
federal court her state petition for presuit discovery or independent 
action for an equitable bill of discovery, and that the federal court will 
then be reluctant to allow the discovery in the face of Twombly and Iqbal. 
A defendant may argue for removal based on diversity of the parties to 
the discovery action or, perhaps, based on any federal question presented 
by the underlying substantive cause of action. But removal probably is 
not available in these cases. Indeed, courts usually refuse to allow removal 
of presuit discovery petitions.109 They reason that presuit discovery is not 
a civil action within the meaning of the removal statute.110 This view is 
likely correct, for presuit discovery is a procedural device rather than a 
cause of action for substantive relief. Courts have also held that 
independent actions for equitable bills of discovery are not removable,111 
 
105 Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (restricting removal to “civil action[s]”). 
110 See Young v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1254 (M.D. 
Ala. 2008) (citing cases following the majority rule); McCrary v. Kansas City S. R.R., 
121 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that Texas Rule 202 does not 
initiate a civil action within the meaning of the removal statute because it asserts no 
claim or cause of action upon which relief could be granted); In re Hinote, 179 F.R.D. 
335, 336 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that Alabama Rule 27 is a request for discovery, 
not a civil action within the meaning of the federal removal statute). But see In re 
Texas, 110 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522–23 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding a petition for presuit 
discovery is a civil action under the removal statutes), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. 
Texas v. Real Parties in Interest, 259 F.3d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 2001). 
111 See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 651 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that an 
equitable bill of discovery is not removable); Young, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (same). 
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though as an independent cause of action, that seems less certain. 
Nevertheless, removal would still be unavailable if the parties are not 
diverse (or, even if the parties are diverse, if the defendant is a citizen of 
the forum state),112 or if the amount in controversy is not met (likely to 
fail, given that the relief sought is merely equitable discovery113). Finally, 
the Supreme Court has held that the All Writs Act is generally 
unavailable to allow removal of otherwise non-removable actions that 
threaten to interfere with federal proceedings.114 All told, removal to a 
hostile federal forum is unlikely. 
Second, the plaintiff may worry that a state court will not permit 
presuit discovery if her claim is a federal claim. No presuit discovery 
mechanism I am aware of so limits presuit discovery. A few mechanisms, 
such as Alabama’s rule, limit presuit discovery to causes of action that can 
be heard in the courts of that state,115 but state courts generally can hear 
federal causes of action, including civil rights claims under § 1983 and 
federal antidiscrimination claims. It is true that a select few causes of 
action provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction—federal antitrust and 
securities fraud claims are prime examples.116 But states generally 
recognize analogous causes of action—say, breach of fiduciary duties, 
unfair competition, or even state antitrust claims—that should cover 
sufficiently similar allegations such that the presuit discovery mechanism 
would allow discovery of facts needed to plead the federal cause of 
action. 
Third, the costs of presuit discovery may be prohibitive. Plaintiffs 
truly confronted with information asymmetry may face a substantial ex 
ante uncertainty about the merit of their claims. The cost of presuit 
discovery may outweigh the possibility and benefit of a meritorious claim, 
but this does not seem very likely. Most states, even Texas, limit presuit 
discovery far more than the full discovery parties employ after the filing 
of a formal lawsuit.117 Plaintiffs deterred by the limited costs of presuit 
discovery ought to be even more deterred from filing a formal lawsuit. If 
anything, the limited cost of presuit discovery ought to benefit plaintiffs 
overall, for those plaintiffs deterred by the cost of a formal lawsuit may be 
able to use the presuit discovery mechanism to buy, relatively cheaply, a 
 
But see Hernandez Perez v. Citibank, N.A., 328 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(holding an equitable bill of discovery under Florida law to be removable under the 
Edge Act). 
112 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b). 
113 See, e.g., Stoller v. Nissan Motor Corp., 934 F. Supp. 423, 424 (S.D. Fla. 1996) 
(remanding a removed equitable bill of discovery for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction because the amount in controversy requirement was not met). 
114 See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002). 
115 ALA. R. CIV. P. 27 (“A person who desires to . . . obtain discovery under Rule 
34 or Rule 35 regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of this state may file a 
verified petition . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
116 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); Clayton (Antitrust) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(2006); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2006). 
117 Hoffman, supra note 8, at 225–26. 
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free look at the merits of the case. On balance, the cost limitations of 
presuit discovery are minimal and, compared to the alternative of full 
discovery, probably amount to a net cost benefit. 
Fourth, there may be equitable objections if defendants cannot 
access state presuit discovery mechanisms for their compulsory 
counterclaims.118 Conceivably, the catch-22 of federal pleading could 
apply to defendants with counterclaims just as it does to plaintiffs.119 This 
inequity is less stark if, as in most cases relevant to this Article, the 
defendant is the one invoking the federal forum by removing the case. In 
addition, a defendant with a compulsory counterclaim can always sue 
first, in effect turning the tables on the other party. And, there may still 
be opportunities for a defendant to take advantage of equitable bills of 
discovery in state court while the federal case is pending.120 
3. Major Limitations 
There are, however, several major limitations on the use of state 
presuit discovery mechanisms to cure the federal pleadings catch-22. 
State court authority over presuit actions is cabined by federal due 
process considerations and may be, additionally, by state venue rules and 
state long-arm statutes. Thus, a plaintiff may find herself confined to one 
of the states that recognizes neither presuit investigative discovery nor 
equitable bills of discovery. 
In addition, some states’ mechanisms may not allow presuit discovery 
in particular instances.121 For example, some states that recognize 
equitable bills of discovery do so only after a plaintiff has filed a lawsuit 
on the substantive claim,122 and it is unclear whether the bill would be 
allowed if the claim is before a federal, as opposed to a state, court. I have 
not found a case in which a state court has allowed an equitable bill of 
discovery ancillary to a federal case. The dearth of opinions suggests that 
such a split proceeding is not likely to be allowed. However, one court 
that has denied a bill of discovery based on ancillary proceedings in 
federal court, did so only on the grounds that the federal court provided 
an adequate opportunity for the discovery requested.123 In other words, 
 
118 I thank Professor Michael Steven Green for raising this point. 
119 Twombly and Iqbal, as constructions of Rule 8(a), surely apply to 
counterclaims, though they probably do not apply to defenses, which are governed by 
Rules 8(b) and (c). FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
120 See infra text accompanying notes 123–124. 
121 In addition, it is possible that the use of state presuit discovery mechanisms to 
survive federal pleading standards, a role for which they likely were not intended, will 
engender significant pushback among state courts and legislatures, ultimately 
resulting in a restriction on their utility. My thanks to Professor Lonny Hoffman for 
raising this point. 
122 Barron, supra note 100, at 670. 
123 See Trak Microwave Corp. v. Culley, 728 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(per curiam). Analogous situations of underlying proceedings in foreign jurisdictions 
also depend not upon the separateness of the judicial systems but rather the 
availability of discovery in the underlying case. See, e.g., Debt Settlement Adm’rs, LLC 
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what doomed the bill was not that it was ancillary to a federal court—it 
was that the federal court provided an adequate discovery mechanism. 
Perhaps if the federal court had not provided an adequate opportunity 
for discovery—because of, say, a high pleading standard—the equitable 
bill would have issued.124 That outcome is very uncertain, however. If 
discovery is not available, then plaintiffs will have to file solely in state 
court and seek a bill of discovery prior to removal of the substantive 
claim.125 
Similarly, asymmetry between state and federal pleading standards 
may undermine a plaintiff’s attempt to justify state presuit discovery. In 
other words, a plaintiff who makes the case for presuit discovery based 
upon the notice pleading standards of, for example, Ohio,126 may be 
limited by the court to discovering only enough facts to plead her case 
under that liberal standard, preventing her from obtaining other facts 
that she might need to survive the stricter Twombly-Iqbal federal standard. 
Or, perhaps more likely, she has sufficient information to bring a case 
under that notice pleading standard already and will be denied the 
opportunity to use the presuit discovery mechanism to obtain additional 
discovery needed to meet the federal standard.127 This problem may 
indeed reduce the utility of using the presuit discovery mechanisms of 
notice pleading states whose mechanism does not extend to plaintiffs 
who are able to file a state complaint without presuit discovery. In 
relation, plaintiffs may resist filing presuit discovery for fear that their 
allegations of inability to plead a cause of action will be used against 
them later.128 
 
v. Antigua & Barbuda, 950 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (foreign 
proceeding). Indeed, in one foreign case, the fact that the foreign case had been 
reduced to a judgment and was no longer open to discovery was used by the court to 
allow a state equitable bill of discovery. See Otto’s Heirs v. Kramer, 797 So. 2d 594, 
596–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
124 One might question how this would work in practice, particularly if the 
federal court would be likely to dismiss the federal case under Rule 12(b)(6) prior to 
the completion of discovery in state court. One simple way to avoid the logistical 
timing issues would be for the federal court to dismiss only on the condition that an 
amended complaint is not filed within a certain period of time, with that period 
being long enough for the state discovery to be completed. 
125 This may not be as time-sensitive as it initially sounds, at least for certain cases. 
Removal must take place in thirty days, but that clock only begins to run from the 
time that the action first becomes removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). Thus, a 
plaintiff who asserts a non-removable claim initially may simultaneously seek an 
equitable bill of discovery and then, after obtaining the information, add the 
removable claim. 
126 OHIO CIV. R. 8(A); Fancher v. Fancher, 455 N.E.2d 1344, 1347–48 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1982) (confirming that Ohio is a notice pleading state). 
127 On the other hand, the pleading asymmetry may work in favor of presuit 
discovery. A notice pleading state whose presuit discovery mechanism can be used 
only to supplement a sufficient pleading with additional facts may provide the 
plaintiff with access to presuit discovery because she met the state notice pleading 
standard, even if her fear is a failure to meet the stricter federal pleading standard. 
128 See Hoffman, supra note 56, at 31. 
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Finally, limitations periods may curtail the utility of presuit discovery. 
Most states provide that presuit discovery tolls the limitations period for 
filing the underlying state causes of action in state court.129 Federal courts 
hearing state causes of action on diversity generally would credit that 
state rule,130 but federal courts hearing federal causes of action may not. 
It may be that federal courts would allow the tolling as a matter of federal 
law, but that is unclear. The resulting uncertainty in the face of an easy 
limitations defense may discourage the use of presuit discovery if it would 
either cause a claim to be filed outside its limitations period or if it could 
not be completed before the limitations period expired.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The use of state presuit discovery mechanisms has promise as a way 
to avoid the catch-22 of federal pleading standards. In cases in which they 
are applicable, state presuit discovery mechanisms ought to be used more 
robustly by plaintiffs who fear that their complaints would otherwise be 
dismissed under the federal plausibility pleading standard. 
But state presuit discovery is not a panacea. It has significant 
limitations for use in federal pleading. For those who believe presuit 
discovery ought to be available to soften Twombly and Iqbal, amending 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 or providing for presuit discovery by 
statute may be the best way to achieve that goal and to avoid the 
limitations that state presuit discovery entails. The rulemaking and 
statutory processes have their downsides. They can be cumbersome, and 
a rule proposal would have to win the blessings of a Court that is highly 
skeptical of current tools to control discovery costs.  
If one of these routes is taken however, state presuit discovery may 
serve an additional role as a model for federal reform. Perhaps it could 
be used to propose a Rule 27 amendment or federal presuit discovery 
statute that not only would alleviate the information asymmetry problems 
created by Twombly and Iqbal but also would be focused enough to 
assuage concerns about high discovery costs. I leave for another day just 
what such a proposal would look like. 
 
129 Hoffman, supra note 8, at 266–67. 
130 Federal courts generally must apply both the state statute of limitations, see 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945), and state tolling principles, see 
Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949). 
